
Yield aggregator
Yearn Finance
2020yearn.fi ↗YFI market data →
Also known as Yearn, yearn.finance, YFI, yVaults, stYFI, veYFI, yETH, Yearn V3
yearn finance
Yearn Finance is a decentralised yield aggregator on Ethereum and several other chains: you deposit a token into a vault and Yearn's strategies move it between lending markets and liquidity pools to earn more of that token. It launched with the YFI token in July 2020, was started by Andre Cronje and is now run as a DAO by YFI holders; its vaults held about $204 million on 27 September 2026.
Our read
Yearn is still the aggregator with the most public machinery: per-strategy risk scores, a disclosure log going back to 2020 and fee rules written into contracts. That record also includes four exploits, the latest in late 2025 on the yETH pool, which Yearn treats as a separate, depositor-governed product it will not reimburse. Use the V3 vaults with a risk level you have read, and treat anything outside them as its own protocol.
Key facts
- Total value locked
- ≈$204.5 million, about $182 million on Ethereum and $18 million on Katana
- Sep 2026 · DefiLlama ↗
- YFI supply
- 36,666 minted of 36,666; 30,000 originally distributed to liquidity providers over about 7 days
- Sep 2026 · Yearn Docs ↗
- V3 protocol fee
- Yearn treasury takes a share (0–50%, set per factory) of each vault's management and performance fees
- Sep 2026 · Yearn Docs ↗
- Governance staking
- stYFI replaced veYFI; rewards paid in yvUSDC, 14-day linear unstaking cooldown
- Sep 2026 · Yearn Docs ↗
What is Yearn Finance?
Yearn began in early 2020 as Andre Cronje's tool for moving stablecoins to whichever lending protocol paid most. In July 2020 he released YFI by distributing it to users: 30,000 tokens went to liquidity providers over about a week, and minting control passed from Cronje to a multisig shortly after. Supply was later fixed at 36,666 YFI (YFI docs). Today the project is run by contributor teams funded by the DAO and governed by YFI holders.
The product is the vault: deposit one token, receive a vault share (a yvToken), and strategies put the underlying to work. You are paid in the same token you deposited. Yearn also runs curated vaults on other platforms, liquid lockers such as yCRV, and experiments that sit outside the core vaults; the yETH pool exploited in 2025 was one of those.
How Yearn vaults work, and what they charge
In V3, each vault can hold several strategies, and a separate Accountant contract sets its management and performance fees. Yearn's treasury then takes a protocol share of those fees, configurable from 0% to 50%. The docs' worked example: a vault earns 100, charges a 20% performance fee (20), and Yearn takes 10% of that (2) while the vault manager keeps 18 (protocol fees). The APY shown in the app is after fees.
Every strategy gets a risk score. Six measures cover the strategy itself (review, test coverage, code size, loss scenarios, privileged roles, number of integrations) and five cover each external protocol it touches (audits, centralisation, TVL, age, type). The sum maps to a level from 1 (lowest) to 4, and a multi-strategy vault takes the highest level of any strategy in it. On the protocol side, an integration with more than $480 million in TVL scores best and one under $10 million worst; a protocol live for 24 months or more scores best on age (risk score).
| Risk level | Score total | Example inputs that push the score up |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10–20 | Lowest band; blue-chip integrations such as Aave or Compound score 1 on protocol type |
| 2 | 21–30 | Lower test coverage or more external protocols |
| 3 | 31–40 | Longer code, younger protocols (under 24 months), lower TVL |
| 4 | 41+ | Highest band; RWA protocols score 5 on protocol type |
A USDC vault's rate is the blended rate of its strategies minus fees; it changes daily. Rates on Yearn are rarely the highest on a given day, because the higher-yield venues usually score worse.
Yearn hacks and exploits, including yETH in December 2025
On 30 November 2025 (disclosed 1 December) an attacker broke the yETH weighted stableswap pool, a basket of eight liquid staking tokens. They pushed the pool's solver into an invalid state, over-minted yETH, drained the pool, then re-entered its initialisation path and minted about 2.35 × 10⁵⁶ yETH to empty the yETH/ETH Curve pool as well (disclosure). DefiLlama puts the loss at about $9 million. 857.49 pxETH was recovered with help from the Plume and Dinero teams; the rest went through Tornado Cash.
Yearn's position is that yETH is governed by its own depositors and, under YIP-72's "use at own risk" clause, Yearn contributors are not liable to reimburse. Recovered assets go back to yETH depositors. V2 and V3 vaults were not affected.
| Date | Product | Loss | Cause |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 Feb 2021 | v1 yDAI vault | 11M DAI | Curve 3pool imbalance loop; 24M DAI saved in 11 minutes |
| 13 Apr 2023 | Legacy yUSDT (iearn) | ≈$11.5M | Misconfigured legacy token contract |
| 26 Nov 2025 | yUSND vault strategy | ≈25,549 USND | Slippage selling liquidation rewards; absorbed by Yearn |
| 30 Nov 2025 | yETH pool | ≈$9M | Solver invariant break, over-mint |
| 16 Dec 2025 | Yearn product (per DefiLlama) | ≈$0.3M | Donation attack |
The common thread: losses came from legacy or side products (v1 vaults, iearn tokens, yETH), not from the V2/V3 vault contracts that hold most deposits today.
Yearn Finance news: where it stands in 2026
DefiLlama counted about $204.5 million in Yearn on 27 September 2026, 3% of the $6.9 billion peak in December 2021 (DefiLlama). Ethereum holds almost all of it; the second-largest deployment is Katana, at about $18 million.
- Governance: veYFI, the lock-based system, is deprecated. YFI holders now stake into stYFI (vote themselves) or stYFIx (delegate), paid in yvUSDC with a 14-day unstaking cooldown.
- Products: V3 multi-strategy vaults, curated vaults run for other platforms, and yBOLD-family stability-pool vaults, which were re-engineered after the November 2025 yUSND loss.
- Security: yETH recovery efforts were still described as ongoing in the last disclosure.
Incident log
5 entries · $31.9M lost in total · repaid, confirmed: 0 of 5 where user funds were at stake
Exploit$300K
Donation attack on a Yearn product
DefiLlama records a roughly $300,000 donation attack, a share-accounting manipulation, against a Yearn Finance product on Ethereum. Yearn had not published a disclosure for it in its security repository as of 27 September 2026.
Repayment unknownNo Yearn disclosure or reimbursement record found.Exploit$9.0M
yETH stableswap pool drained
An attacker forced the yETH pool's fixed-point solver into an invalid state, over-minted yETH LP tokens, drained the eight-LST pool and then used an arithmetic underflow in the initialisation path to mint about 2.35 × 10⁵⁶ yETH and drain the yETH/ETH Curve pool. Yearn V2/V3 vaults were not affected.
Partly repaid857.49 pxETH was recovered with Plume and Dinero and is being returned to yETH depositors; Yearn says it is not liable to reimburse the rest under YIP-72. Loss figure from DefiLlama.Other$26K
yUSND vault strategy loses 5.76% on a liquidation auction
A liquidation in Nerite's rETH stability pool paid the yUSND strategy about 17.02 rETH; selling it back into thin USND liquidity returned about 46,800 USND for collateral worth about $78,660, a 25,549 USND loss.
Repaid — company's word onlyYearn's disclosure says it fully absorbed the loss and user principal was unaffected; not independently verified.Exploit$11.5M
Legacy yUSDT token exploited through misconfiguration
An attacker exploited a misconfigured legacy iearn yUSDT contract, a pre-v2 product, to extract about $11.5 million. Current Yearn vaults were not involved.
Repayment unknownWe found no published reimbursement record; figure and classification from DefiLlama's hacks database.Exploit$11.0M
v1 yDAI vault exploited through Curve 3pool imbalance
Over 11 transactions, an attacker unbalanced Curve's 3pool and made the yDAI vault deposit and withdraw at bad rates. Loose 1% slippage protection and a withdrawal fee switched off for migrations made it profitable. 11M DAI of deposits were lost; the team stopped it after 11 minutes, saving 24M of 35M DAI.
Repayment unknownYearn's disclosure describes the loss but not whether vault depositors were repaid; we could not confirm reimbursement.
In our ratings
This page is the record. The scores sit on the review cards, next to the evidence and the weights they came from.
Compare Yearn Finance with
BeefyYield aggregator · 2020Beefy is a multichain auto-compounding vault protocol launched in 2020, live on about 40 chains, with a fixed 80,000 BIFI supply and a pseudonymous team.
Convex FinanceYield aggregator · 2021Convex Finance boosts Curve LP rewards using the veCRV it has locked forever; it takes 17% of CRV earned and its multisig cannot touch deposits.
MorphoLending protocol · FranceMorpho is a lending network of isolated markets and curator-run vaults, with over $14 billion deposited. Coinbase and Robinhood build products on it.
AaveLending protocol · 2017Aave is the largest on-chain lending protocol, with about $19 billion locked. V4, live since March 2026, splits lending into hubs and spokes.
Frequently asked questions
Who created Yearn Finance?+
Andre Cronje, who launched YFI in July 2020 and handed minting control to a multisig soon after; the protocol is now run by DAO-funded contributors.
Was Yearn hacked in December 2025?+
Its separate yETH pool was drained for about $9 million on 30 November 2025; Yearn's main V2 and V3 vaults were not affected, and only part of the loss has been recovered.
How much does a Yearn vault charge?+
Each vault sets its own management and performance fees, and Yearn takes a share of those; the APY shown in the app is already net of fees.
What replaced veYFI?+
stYFI, a staking system paying rewards in yvUSDC with a 14-day unstaking cooldown.
How many YFI tokens exist?+
36,666, all minted. Price and market data are on our [YFI coin page](/market/yearn-finance).
What changed
- Profile published.
Compiled by
Blockchain Security Researcher · September 27, 2026
We have no commercial relationship with Yearn Finance and earn nothing from any link on this page. Every fact above carries the date it was true and a link to where it comes from; if one is out of date, the contact page reaches the editor who keeps this file.