Anthias Labs
Anthias Labs is a risk advisory firm founded in 2022. Since May 2025 it has been risk partner for Moonwell's Base markets, recommending collateral factors, caps and rate curves every 28 days, and it curates the Moonwell Ecosystem USDC vault on Morpho.
Suits: Moonwell users on Base who want to follow the parameter reasoning month by month
How this score was reached
Every firm starts at 10.0. The lines below are the only things that move it: each event on the ledger after credits for the response, and the two firm-level checks. Repeated or large incidents with incomplete responses.
| Start | 10.0 |
| 27 Aug 2026 — MAMO market manipulation on Moonwell Base | −1.0 |
| 15 Feb 2026 — cbETH oracle misconfiguration on Moonwell Base | −1.0 |
| Public risk methodology | −1.5 |
| At least one year of documented mandates | 0.0 |
| Score | 6.5 |
|---|
The facts, with sources
A value with no source does not count toward the score. Where a fact could not be found it reads “not published” and is scored by the published rule for missing data.
| Criterion | Value | Source | Checked |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public risk methodology | Not publishedChecked anthias.xyz, its Moonwell mandate proposal and its Morpho curator introduction. Its monthly recommendations explain individual changes and it publishes research on liquidation risk, but no document sets out the general method. | anthias.xyz ↗ | 21 Sept 2026 |
| First documented mandate or vault | 15 May 2025Proposed as risk partner for Moonwell's Base markets | forum.moonwell.fi ↗ | 21 Sept 2026 |
| Mandate — Moonwell (Base) | Risk partner: collateral factors, caps, interest-rate curvesSince May 2025 | forum.moonwell.fi ↗ | 21 Sept 2026 |
| Mandate — Morpho | Curator, Moonwell Ecosystem USDC vaultSince October 2025 | forum.morpho.org ↗ | 21 Sept 2026 |
| Incidents on the ledger | 2Each listed below with its sources | — | 21 Sept 2026 |
On the record
- Wrote both Moonwell post-mortems itself, within two days of each event, with full bad-debt tables.
- Its monitoring caught the cbETH mispricing four minutes after the faulty proposal executed, and it cut the market caps immediately.
Against it
- Two losses on Moonwell's Base markets in 2026: about $2.68M of user losses from the cbETH oracle misconfiguration in February, and about $9.13M of residual debt from the MAMO market manipulation in August.
- Neither event has a confirmed payout: the cbETH plan combined a partial repayment with a share of future revenue and remediation questions were still open in August 2026; the MAMO recovery plan is still under discussion.
- No public document states the method behind its parameter recommendations, which costs 1.5 points.
Anthias Labs on the ledger
- −1.0
MAMO market manipulation on Moonwell Base
Role: Risk partner for Moonwell's Base markets; MAMO listed at a 50% collateral factor
- Loss or bad debt
- $9.13M−2.0About $9.131M of borrower obligations left after liquidation — Anthias' best estimate of residual and potential bad debt.
- Response
- ✓ Post-mortem in 1 day +1.0— No confirmed payout— No ignored public warning documented
An actor inflated the mMAMO exchange rate by transferring MAMO straight into the contract and pushed MAMO's price up through thin liquidity, then borrowed about $11.03M. Liquidations began 32 seconds after the last borrow; Anthias published the post-mortem the next day.
A recovery plan for the affected USDC market was put to governance on 4 September 2026; no payout confirmed.
Primary sourcePost-Mortem: MAMO Market Incident on Base — Anthias Labs ↗Payout record ↗
- −1.0
cbETH oracle misconfiguration on Moonwell Base
Role: Risk partner for Moonwell's Base markets
- Loss or bad debt
- $2.68M−2.0About $2.68M of net losses across roughly 181 borrowers per Moonwell's recovery plan; protocol bad debt was $1,779,044.83 per Anthias' post-mortem.
- Response
- ✓ Post-mortem in 2 days +1.0— No confirmed payout— No ignored public warning documented
Its monitoring flagged the mispricing at 18:05 UTC, four minutes after governance proposal MIP-X43 executed with an oracle reading only the cbETH/ETH ratio; it cut the cbETH supply and borrow caps to 0.01, but liquidations continued until the oracle could be fixed through the five-day governance process.
A recovery plan combined a partial repayment from a treasury with a share of future protocol revenue, claimable over 12 months; we found no confirmation of payouts, and remediation questions were still open on the forum in August 2026.
Primary sourceMIP-X43 cbETH Oracle Incident Summary — Anthias Labs ↗Payout record ↗